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NOTE AND COMMENT
THE LEGAL STATUS OF ABSTRACT BOOKS--LITERARY PROPERTY, IMPLIED CON-
TRACT OF SECRECY, UNFAIR TPADE.-A recent case before the Supreme Court
of Washington raises some novel and interesting questions. A company
engaged in the abstract business mortgaged its "records, bookt, plats." Af-
ter suit was commenced to foreclose the mortgage, the mortgagor, who re-
mained in possession, made photographic copies of the records and sold them
to the defendant who had notice of the mortgage of the originals. The fore-
closure resulted in a sale of the property, described as in the mortgage, to the
plaintiff. Whether plaintiff knew at this time of the existence of the copies
,does not appear. Plaintiff is using the original records in the conduct of an
abstract business and defendant is using the copies in competition with him.
The action was brought to recover the copies. The court holds that it can-
not be maintained because, assuming that the mortgage included the copies,
the copies were not embraced in the sheriff's sale. It asserts, obiter, that the
mortgagee might have enjoined the making of the copies, and it -raises, but
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declines to answer, some other questions concerning the rights of the parties.
Wintlcr Abstract Co. v. Sears (Wash., 1919), 184 Pac. 3o9.
If it was procedurally impossible to treat the action as an equitable suit
to compel surrender of the copies for destruction, the decision was clearly
right. There would seem to be no theory which would support a common
law possessory action. The doctrine of accession most nearly suffices but,
while the case bears some analogy to those of young of animals, it is impos-
sible to extend that doctrine to embrace reproductions by. the hand of man,
involving neither mutilation of the original nor confusion.
But what of other remedies? Ownership of things ordinarily involves no
exclusive right to photograph or copy the things, though the exercise of
the exclusive right of possession may make photographing or copying by
others physically impossible. Sports Press Agency v. "Our Dogs" Publish-
ing Co. [1gi6], 2 K. B. 88o; Flagg Mfg. Co. v. Holway, 178 Mass. 83; Key-
stone Type Foundry v. Portland Publishing Co., i86 Fed. 69o. A fortiori,
the limited interest of a mortgagee ordinarily gives no such exclusive right.
But the subject of this mortgage was peculiar, and upon its peculiarity the
mortgagee, and the purchaser under him, may well base a claim to protection
from the dishonest acts of the mortgagor and his purchaser. There aire three
distinct theories which might plausibly be argued: (i) literary property,
(2) implied contract, (3) unfair competition.
In the facts which constitute the subject matter of abstract books, no one.
of course, can have any property. But, as a compilation of information, such
books would seem to be within the doctrine of literary property. Dart v.
Woodhouse, 40 Mich. 399; Perry v. Big Rapids, 67 Mich. 146; Banker v.
Caldzvell, 3 ,Nlinn. 94; Vernon Abstract Co. v. Waggoner Title Co., 49 Tex.
Civ. App. i44 (seinble). In Leon Abstract Co. v. Equalization Board, 86 Ia.
127, a contrary conclusion was based on the fact that such books are not a
"work of genius or the development of new tho.ughts or ideas" (dissenting
opinion in Perry v. Big Rapids, supra, adopted by this court), and upon the
fact that the manuscript was not designed for publication but was designed
to be kept from publication. Both lines of reasoning are unsound. Bleistein
v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., i88 U. S. 239; Prince Albert v. Strange, 2
DeG. & Sm. 652. The Supreme Court of Washington, however, is commit-
ted to this view. Booth Co. v. Phelps, 8 Wash. 549.
If the theory of literary property be admitted at all, the next question is
whether there has been such a general publication as to destroy it. In Ver-
non Abstract Co. v. Waggoner Title Co., supra, it was held that furnishing
abstracts to the general public was such a publication, the limited purpose of
the publication being considered immaterial. The opposite is implicit in the
Michigan and Minnesota decisions, and the case would seem to be much
stronger than some of the cases of limited publication, e. g., stage production
of a play, Tompkins v. Halleck, 133 Mass. 32; or delivery to university classes
of a lecture, Caird v. Sime, 12 App. Cas. 326.
Literary property can be transferred without any particular formality and,
although sale of a manuscript or painting may be made with reservation of
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the right of reproduction, such a sale may imply an assignment of that right.
Parton v. Prang, 3 Cliff. 537. In view of the comparative uselessness of ab-
stract books without the exclusive right of reproduction, the mortgage and
the sheriff's sale of the books can easily be said to impliedly embrace the lit-
erary property. The right of user, as incident to the right of possession, may
remain in the. mortgagor until foreclosure, but this cannot embrace the right
to make copies for use in derogation of the mortgage of the literary property.
Plaintiff, then, is entitled to enjoin the use of the copies by the mortgagor or
by any purchaser with notice, and is probably entitled to have the copies de-
stroyed. Prince Albert v. Strange, supra.
If the theory of literary property fails, plaintiff may fall back on implied
contract or trust. In the same way, some courts dealing with the right to
prevent general use by a professional photographer of a portrait photograph,
hesitating to recognize a right of privacy, have based relief on implied con-
tract or breach of confidence. Pollard v. Photographic Co.,-L. RL 40 Ch.
Div. 345. Plaintiff's theory is-that, in making the mortgage, the mortgagor
impliedly promised not to make copies of the records to be used by himself
or any one else in competition with the transferee of the originals. Here,
again, the basis for implication is principally the comparative uselessness of
the records if copies are at large. Our case is in many respects analogous to, if
indeed it is not parcel of, the cases on trade secrets. A trade secret is any in-
formation valuable to a business enterprise which the possessor thereof with-
holds from the general public. Its legal protection depends entirely upon con-
tract or trust, express or implied, and implications are freely indulged in this
field, 44 L. R. A. (N.S.) ri6o, note. In the usual case, the information is dis-
closed by the original possessor to an employee and the latter is charged with
the obligation not to disclose or to use for himself such information. There the
obligation is implied from the confidential nature of the disclosure. But the
principle has been reversed where the original possessor of the information
has sold the information to another. Here the implied obligation arises from
the equity against derogating from one's own grant. Pomeroy Ink Co. v.
Pomeroy, 77 N. J. Eq. 293. That is precisely our case, and it seems easy
enough to make out the implied obligation of mortgagor to mortgagee. But
the latter has lost all right to complain, having been paid by the foreclosure,
and, on the other hand, no relief is adequate which does not reach the pur-
chaser from the mortgagor. Can we connect the benefits and burdens of -the
implied contract with the plaintiff and defendant, respectively? It is sub-
mitted that the doctrine of Tulk v. Moxhay is adequate to the task. This
doctrine applies to pdrsonal property as well as land, though in a large per-
centage of the cases which have come before the courts relief has been denied
because the covenant was held to contravene public policy. Murphy v. Chris-
tian Press Co., 38 N. Y. App. Div. 426. That "covenants" may be implied, is
well settled. 45 L. R. A. (N.S.) 962, note; The covenant touches and con-
cerns the records in a most vital way Though it creates a mere "easement
of monopoly," it is easily distinguishable from Norcross v. James, I4o Mass.
188, in that monopoly, more or less extensive, is here of the very essence of
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normal enjoyment. A fortiori, the case is within those authorities opposed
to Norcross v. James. The benefit of the covenant, having been from the
first so vitally connected with the records, would pass with the recorqs with-
out express assignment. JOLLY, RzsTRIcTIvz COVENANTS, 43. And see Vulcan
Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 67 N. J. Eq. 243; Pomeroy Ink Co. v.
Pomeroy, supra; both holding that the benefit of an implied obligation not-to
use or disclose trade secrets passes with the obligee's business. The burden
of the covenant, at first personal, attached to the copies when made, and
passed with the copies to the purchaser without notice. Lewis v. Gollner, 129
N. Y. 227. And see the trade secret cases where relief has been given third
parties with notice. Tabor v. Hoffman, ii8 N. Y. 30; Pressed Steel Car Co.
v. Standard Steel Car Co., 210 Pa. 464.
If it be thought that both these theories are pressed too far, the plaintiff
falls back on the doctrine of unfair competition, as applied in Associated Press
v. International News Service, 248 U. S. 215. The similarity of the cases,
assuming that neither iterary property nor implied contract can be made out
here, is striking. The conspicuous difference, that there the parties were
strangers; while here they are related through the mortgage and subsequent
sales, makes our case the stronger. The formula of the Press- Case, that one
shall not "reap where he has not sown," needs only to be inverted--one shall
not reap where he has bargained and sold his sowing. It may, of course, be
doubted whether the court was justified in its application of this ethical
principle, and it is quite certain that this ethical principle cannot be applied
generally without overturning much settled law. See dissenting opinion of
Brandeis, J., and note, 13 ILL. L. REV. 7o8. But the ethics of our case is at
least as clear as that of the Associated Press case.
It may be admitted that this case taxes our legal dogmas, but it will be a
reproach to the law if, when the plaintiff's case is properly presented, he
cannot be given relief. E. N. D.
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